University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Written by Renato Palmi, 2005
The Role of Civil Society in Development
“Civil Society is the creation of the modern world”
Hegel: The Philosophy of Right
Schecter (2000: 176)
Introduction
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have always played an important role in development. The relationship between key stakeholders, i.e. donor agencies, international development agencies, the State and communities targeted for development aid, is critical for analysis in determining the role NGOs have played in the development. Today NGOs are considered part of and a primary constituent in the body of civil society, even though many of them focus on different roles and goals, as will be exemplified in this paper.
There are many ways to define an NGO. According to Ye, foreign donors and scholars identify NGOs by “looking at the organisation’s relationship with the government.” He says that some observers “… believe the closer the organisation is to the government, the less likely it is to be a real NGO.” (Ye, 2003: 2). However, herein lies a paradox. Due to the intrinsic relationship between donor organisations and/or international NGOs, when it comes to funding and implementation of projects, the State and localised NGOs often form partnerships to operationalise the approved programme.
What is civil society? White (2001: 379) as cited by Sabatini (2002: 8) offers the following definition, from the perspective of international donor agencies, of the concept of civil society:
Generally speaking, donors … define civil society as: an associational realm between State and family, populated by organisations which are separate from the State, enjoying autonomy in relation to the State and … formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values.
The juncture at which civil society comes into conflict with the State is when civil society begins to advocate for either changes in State policies, or with enough vigour to threaten the overthrow of the State. Political confrontations and mistrust between the State and civil society does impede positive developmental projects, and also jeopardises the successful roll-out of developmental aid through civil society, working in partnership with the State.
This paper will reflect on the various factors that contribute either positively or negatively to the complex relationship between civil society and the State. Many governments in the Southern hemisphere adopt the approach that Northern nations are pushing their particular political agendas in veiled ways through the provision of development aid, and that many localised NGOs have unwittingly become pawns for these foreign States in .
The primary tensions that arise between State and civil society when it comes to development are space and power; Roberts (1974: 14) as quoted by Kaplan (1996: 53) explains:
Development is the more equal distribution of power. Thus development in the independent phase demands the more equal distribution of power. The struggle for independence may lead to empowerment Рthe ultimate clich̩ of the development fraternity - but leaves the one thus empowered with the same kind of power as those who have been fought against, precisely because they have this power.
The fundamental argument is: can the State be removed from the equation of development? Due to the complexities and varied definitions of what development is, and what role civil society plays in developmental progress, the importance of the State in such progress (or lack thereof) cannot be denied or diminished. The State’s role is vital to development. The role becomes complicated by governmental attitudes that view the politicisation of civil society as a threat, but at the same time consider developmental NGOs as desired contributors in that NGOs can relieve some of the State’s responsibilities in terms of delivery of public services.
Where governments are ineffective in such delivery, and in need of development funds, it is far easier for donor organisations to dictate the terms of envisaged outcomes. An example of this kind of manipulation is given by Martinussen and Pedersen: “More and more donors wanted to increase foreign aid only to those countries that could document that they had formulated and implemented ‘correct’ policies” (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003: 50). Within these same countries civil society can often operate with relative strength, with the understanding that they will be supported by international donor agencies because civil society groups “help to broaden political participation” (Sabatini, 2002: 8).
The conditions under which most NGOs operate in the People’s Republic of China contradict this thinking. As a global economic power, the PRC’s one-party Communist State dictates the terms and conditions that NGOs (in this case, not “civil society”, because there is no such entity in its true form permitted in China) operate within the country’s borders, including the territories that it illegally occupies.
It is interesting to note that the United Nations articulates NGOs as being organisations that:
Steinberg (2001)
… generally function to service under-served or neglected populations, to expand the freedom of or to empower people to engage in advocacy for social change … to democratise unequal power relations aimed at influencing policy or reality itself.
This definition does not apply when it comes to NGOs operating inside China, as no NGO is permitted to work towards “democratis(ing) unequal power relations” in China.
The History of NGOs and Civil Society
Many commentators argue, as does Schechter, that it was the rise in Poland of the Solidarity movement in 1981 that: “…constituted civil society as an autonomous socio-political space against the State” (Schecter, 2000: 1). The rise of the civil society movement in Europe contributed towards the fall of the Berlin War in 1989, which led to the collapse of Communism and the ending of the Cold War. These changes in global politics in turn paved the way for transformation within the development sector worldwide.
During the course of the past few decades, NGOs have evolved in accordance with the demands set by funding agencies as well as changes that have taken place in the global political landscape. Four categories of NGOs have been discerned during this period: according to Martinussen and Pedersen, first-generation NGOs focus on “emergency relief efforts” while second-generation NGOs “enter into co-operation with target groups.” Third-generation NGOs not only work with local communities but also aim “to change the structures and institutions in society”, leading to the fourth-generation NGOs that directly confront the State on social issues (2003: 145 –146).
Globalisation has played a pivotal role in the development of the broader civil society movement and its relationship with the State; Schechter (2000: 14 – 17) argues thus:
The rise of civil society to theoretical prominence in recent years has been accompanied by a parallel surge in interest in globalisation. This interest has been accompanied by the increasing awareness that the territorially located nation-state will not play a pre-eminent role in political life … The innumerable conflicts in the post-Cold War world indicate that the problems of world peace and environmental safety simply go beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. It is in this context that much hope has been aroused by global civil society, represented at least in outline by the growing number of Non– and Quasi-Governmental Organisations.
Donor Agencies, Civil Society and the State
NGOs are invariably linked to aid agencies due to their dependency on funding from such development aid agencies. During the Cold War, developmental aid was linked to foreign policy by donor countries, but the end of the Cold War altered both the concept of such aid and the contexts within which it has since been approved and secured.
The original goals of providing development funds may have changed, but as Martinussen and Pedersen conclude: “Donors set most of the agenda and the conditions of co-operation” (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003: 1). These authors claim that foreign aid, even since the end of the Cold War, has expanded to: “… from changing … economic and social conditions to including institutional development and political reforms” (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003: 4).
The role of the State in recipient countries is vital. Many donor countries and agencies still regard these countries’ governments as restrictive entities but are compelled to defer to statutory bodies as conduits for their funding. It is here that the paradox of the relationship between development agencies and the State comes into play. It is not uncommon for NGOs to receive funding distributed by government ministries that have received the monies from development aid agencies that are often in conflict with the State over social issues.
Globalisation
In the modern, globalised world, NGOs play a pivotal role in ensuring that governments comply with and carry out their elected roles to uplift their citizens economically and socially. It is in this context that NGOs can both assist and hinder the State. Many governments view the surge in NGO growth as an opportunity to transfer or “delegate” State responsibilities to NGOs, and are not above using NGOs for political mobilisation. Maslyukivska (1999: 2) gives such an example of governments using NGOs for their own benefit:
The conservative governments of Reagan and Thatcher made support for the voluntary sector a central part of their strategies to reduce government social spending.
Conversely, it is argued that the growth of NGOs serves to counter the strength of the State and the financial market when it comes to development. In an assessment of the role NGOs play in development, Sha says: “ … the complex group termed ‘NGOs’ are seen as the weaker part of the triumvirate, or “third sector” to counter the other two actors, the State and the market” Sha, 2003: 3). The State, Sha argues, may welcome the intervention of NGOs when it comes to assisting with social issues such as: “ … providing for the homeless, elderly and sick, not least because this reduces State expenditure, it may take less kindly to advocacy groups that promote causes contrary to government policy or organisations that challenge the legitimacy of the State”. (Sha, 2003: 4).
A further challenge facing NGOs and development work in general are the continually evolving local and international political platforms. Some NGOs that have worked towards development goals in specific communities find themselves having to contest social and political issues with officials of the very government they fought for, in order to bring about critical change in countries. A prime example is South Africa.
NGO Relationship with States
Many of the large NGOs in the Northern hemisphere are reliant on funding from their own governments. This dependency calls into question the veracity of the term “non-governmental” and the organisations’ impartiality. This follows the thinking of Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 162) who say:
Have they [Northern NGOs] lost some of their political independence and special character and instead come to resemble official aid organisations with respect to objectives and strategies?
According to Martinussen and Pedersen, due to the negative connotations inherent in this particular position, many international developmental NGOs - such as Oxfam’s branch in the USA - made policy changes restricting the amount of State-derived funding, or formulated firm policy guidelines for accepting such funds (2003: 164). In so doing, these NGOs have attempted to deflect groundless allegations from recipient States that the NGOs are mere “front companies” for foreign governments.
Many NGOs in the Southern hemisphere have taken the form of “gap-fillers”, Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 166), by helping their governments with roll-out of projects and specifically with ensuring that donor funds reach the targeted beneficiaries. These authors argue that NGOs, particularly in the South, are forced into this role because: “The State has narrowed its functions, due to economic decline or pressure from development banks and other donor organisations” (2003: 166).
The fundamental dilemma posed by this paradoxical relationship between NGOs and the State rests on difficult choices such as: if the State allows NGOs to take on its role of service provider for certain developmental projects, should the State then relinquish its authority in this sector, or could it reserve the right to dictate the terms and conditions of how the NGO operates?
The People’s Republic of China is an example of NGOs being allowed to operate only under the specified conditions directed by the State. In viewing the relationship between local NGOs and the State in sub-Saharan Africa, Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 167 and 168) observe:
Central authorities rarely interfere in the work of private organisations at the micro-level in remote regions … because they do not have the capacity to do so. However, local politicians often do interfere in NGOs’ work. In weak States, where authorities already have problems legitimising their exercise of power, difficulties can arise when NGOs assume the role of communicating and supporting the demands of the poor, marginalised and oppressed groups in society.
Even developmental NGOs that are not politically orientated have an obligation to inform the communities they are assisting on their social rights, which in turn can bring NGOs into conflict with the State.
The extent to which NGOs serve to relieve the State from its elected obligations is another cause for concern, that being the question of transparency and accountability. Edwards and Hulme (1996: 968) as quoted by Cross (1997) argue:
… there is a deeper concern about the possible rewriting of the ‘social contract’ between government and its citizens as a result of NGO substitution for the State in key aspects of the development process … The accountability of a non-elected NGO when providing services to ‘clients’ is very different to the formal relationships established between governments and citizens.
This highlights the issue that States can renege on their obligations to society because the NGO sector is, in effect, doing the work that the electorate, and particularly taxpayers, rightfully expect their government to undertake. This can apply if the State has truly relinquished total control of any development projects undertaken by the NGO. Conditions like this have spotlighted the importance of open and negotiated participation between the State and NGOs.
Civil society and the State - Competitors or Partners?
An essential question regarding the functioning of NGOs is, according to Cross: “ … whether NGOs should be competitors or partners with the State – that is, whether NGOs should maintain their distance from the State so as to retain their autonomy, or whether they should work hand-in-hand with State projects” (Cross, 1997: 2). This argument is dependent on the stance of the donor country or aid agency funding the NGOs.
Due to the agenda or policies of specific aid agencies, NGOs may have to rely either on the State for funds, or on monies channelled through governments by donor agencies. Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 12) point out that:
Large industrial countries in particular have administrated and distributed a large part of their development assistance in accordance with political and national security priorities. The same applied earlier to the development assistance provided by the Soviet Union, and it still applies to aid from India and China.
The role of donor agencies and their usage of NGOs for developmental projects is taken further in the comments of Howell and Pearce, as cited by Sha, who argue that often donors think of themselves as being: “ … neutral actors, brokering relations between the State, business, and civil society” (Sha, 2003: 5). They also contend that development aid directed from the North to the South may well be another form of neo-colonialism, “… in the post-Cold War era, aimed at controlling the nature of political regimes and extending global markets.”
The approach by Northern countries and donor agencies focusing on development in the Southern regions is that the recipient governments cannot, on their own, make positive contributions to development. Berthoud (1992: 73) argues that the State is an extension of development, and observes:
Through the State, as the theory goes, one creates, maintains and regulates markets for economic growth, the results of which should be distributed [by NGOs] as fairly as possible throughout society. Growth with redistribution is clearly the model’s ideal of social justice.
Therefore, development agencies contend that their assistance through funding development NGOs within Civil Society results in positive benefits for the recipient countries and communities. This point cannot be denied, but what has been shown is that these agencies can operate with a hidden agenda, and the total dependency by NGOs on State funding nullifies, or at least diminishes, the impartiality of such organisations. In this context, it is difficult to accept the stance taken by many development donor agencies that NGOs can extract themselves from dependency on the State. Where governments provide the channels for disbursement of donor funding, the NGOs themselves become reliant on the State’s co-operation, and the danger exists that procedures and policies could warp the motivation and methods originally intended by the NGOs and their funders.
Participation between NGOs and the State
Some observers claim that there cannot be much collaboration or participation between NGOs and the State until after, “a process of retraining and re-orientation” has taken place, as stated by (Graaff and Louw, 1992 by Roodt, 2001: 489). These authors report on findings that State departments and government leadership become wary of or hostile towards NGOs that attempt to intrude on their space.
However, in times of developmental or national crises, NGOs and governments do come together for the betterment of the citizens of the particular country. A case in point is the collaboration of NGOs and the South African government in the roll-out of the national anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment programme, province by province.
Case Study:
IRIN PlusNews (2004) published the following example of NGO and State collaboration:
About 90 NGOs in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province has teamed up to work with the government in rolling out ARV drugs, in the first structured civil society response of its kind in South Africa. Cati Vawda, Director of the Durban based Children’s Rights Centre stated: “Long-term co-ordination of services between civil society and government, and good monitoring of the process, has very high organisational demands.” Vawda claims that official recognition of the collaboration is still outstanding and the one prohibiting factor is that the Health Department “has not developed an ethos of sharing specific information with civil society as yet.”
The complexities of NGO and State relationship is exemplified in the report by Vawda claiming that the NGOs wish to remain independent and therefore will seek their own funding from foreign non-governmental and international donors. The State, in response to this, may object to particular donors’ involvement or be in conflict with the specific conditions donors might formulate on the NGOs.
In the development environment, the intentions of both the State and civil society might be pure, but such intentions have not manifested into effective delivery to those trying to operationalise policy; this arises either because of lack of capacity or because methodology devised and decisions made remotely, and without due consideration of local contexts, are not workable on the ground.
The above case study is a prime example of this scenario. Another example of sincere beginnings is evident in President Mbeki’s statement that: “The government is also paying the closest attention to … create the possibility for an ongoing dialogue between government and representatives of civil society formations, NGOs” (New Agenda, 2004: 31).
Neither group can dictate models of participation in projects. Instead, a mutual understanding needs to be reached for all the actors to understand their individual and collaborative roles in fulfilling shared goals, which in the final analysis, should remain as the driving motivation and reason for the existence of project. The approach of focusing on common goals and forsaking individual or organisational biases to ensure the success of developmental programmes is give substance by Maslyukivska when he argues: “A healthy relationship is only conceivable when both parties share common objectives” (1999: 21).
The potential for such understanding and effective partnership is often confused and hindered by the tendency for parties to compete against one other for power in their constituencies, particularly in the form of “gate-keeping”. White (1999: 309) puts this forward thus:
Both State and civil society are essentially political and contested domains, in both conceptual and practical terms. NGOs working with the State offer an opportunity to expand the scope of their operations, broaden their influence and participate in the formulation of the national development agenda. The State, on the other hand, may see collaborating with the NGOs as a chance to gain some reflected moral glory, retrieve a hold on donor funds, and neutralise potential opposition, and achieve more efficient and cost-0effective implementation of policy. What is open to question, however, is whether these mutual interests necessarily coincide with the interests of those whose name they all invoke.
The failure of NGOs in Development
While the aims of many developmental NGOs may be legitimate and commendable, some fail in their purpose due to a number of typical shortcomings. The most common is a lack of understanding of the local society and the contexts of its culture, religion, as well as community strengths, needs and priorities. Another factor which creates setbacks is a lack of accountability and transparency. Clark claims: “There is surprisingly little objective reporting of NGO projects … Until recently there has been little [and still is] pressure on donor NGOs for more disciplined evaluations” (Clark, 1991: 53).
These deficiencies are often used by the State to legitimise its negative response to NGO inclusion in formulating development polices. Understanding cultural needs is fundamental to the success of any development project undertaken by NGOs. According to Eade: “[Developmental] strategies must be sensitive to cultural roots” (Eade, 2002: 35). Brunnstrom comments: “Respect for local history and culture, knowledge and practices are acknowledged as basic preconditions for the provision of adequate assistance. The international community frequently disregards them” (Brunnstrom, 2003: 310).
A further limitation impeding the work and tainting perceptions of NGOs in development is an inability to set clearly defined goals; as Brunnstrom describes: “Clear goals and strategies are key to both indigenous and international NGOs in their development work" (Brunnstrom, 2003: 314). Another notable failure derives from the distance between donor NGOs and localised NGOs that implement activities on behalf of their overseas funders. Martinussen and Pedersen explain that: “The distance between … donors and recipients has become greater during the 1980s and 1990s. This greater distance to the final target group of poor people is a problem for most donors (bilateral, multilateral and NGOs)” (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003: 176).
Technological advances such as the Internet and e-mail have, to a certain extent, assisted in narrowing this gap, but only in areas where the required infrastructure to support the use of this technology is available.
China
Civil society faces a great challenge in the People’s Republic of China. Not only does it have to navigate the often confusing bureaucratic procedures set up by the Chinese State authorities to receive accreditation, but NGOs also face the continual scrutiny of the Chinese government, which is intensely alert to any actions that might be deemed as threatening to the stability of China.
Yet, even with the restrictions imposed on NGOs in China, there are success stories, and one has to recognise that through specific targeted projects, China has managed to reduce its poverty levels. Watts reports: “According to the World Bank, the number of people subsisting on less than $1 a day has fallen from 490 million in 1981 to 88 million – or from 49% of the population to 6.9%.”
Chinese State’s use of NGOs
During the 1930s and 1940s, according to Ye, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the insistence of Mao Zedong, actually encouraged civil society organisations within China to join forces in order to fight the Japanese and Kuomintang. After the CCP came to power in 1949, Mao began to purge the very same civil society organisations that helped him come into power. Most NGOs were banned outright, and others such as the Youth League and independent trade unions were incorporated into the State’s apparatus, thereby losing their independence (2003: 6 – 7). Between the 1950s and 1980s, there was very little NGO activity in China due to the State’s stance that most NGOs were counter-revolutionary.
The Chinese State and Civil Society
The 1980s saw China on the road to economic reform and the government recognised that it was not in a position to oversee the many reforms that were needed in rural communities. According to Chen, the Deputy Director of China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs: “All levels of government are taking the nurturing and development of civil organisations as an important component of answering the call for a ‘small government and large society involvement” (Chen, 2001: 5). The Chinese State may encourage the growth of society involvement through social organisations, but their activities and policies are stringently monitored for possible dissension and where any opposition to the State is perceived, as in the case of the religious organisation Falun Gong, such organisations are immediately banned.
The Chinese government maintains that civil society must operate within the framework of the law, and would never allow organisations the visibility or public platform to challenge its authority, (as did South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign). The Chinese government claims that many NGOs are not in a position to act independently and are plagued by corruption and incompetence. Chen (2001: 3) comments:
NGOs are not yet ready to operate independently … Because the structures of some NGOs do not accord with the requirements of a market economy, they have a tendency to rely overly much on the government. Internal controls within China’s NGOs are imperfect as they lack a complete set of democratic management mechanisms, thereby greatly weakening their effectiveness.
However, the wording used by Chen is misleading. Since the Chinese State is far from being democratic, how can it be claimed that NGOs lack “democratic management mechanisms”, and were they to demonstrate any signs of democratic leanings or independence of mindset, they could be deemed as a threat to the State and closed down.
In fairness, Chen does claim that China does not (at the time of his writing) have any policies in place to properly regulate non-profit organisations. Ye backs Chen’s contention that there is corruption and a lack of accountability within China’s civil society sector (2003: 20). The question of accountability by China’s development stakeholders is no different to that faced by many other NGOs and States throughout the world.
A recent newspaper report published in the China Daily reiterated the need for NGOs in China to assist the government in providing social services. The report stated that at present, there are 134,000 registered NGOs in China (2004). The report also confirmed that in order for these organisations to work in China, they must have a link with the State in the form of “a governmental department or semi-official body as sponsor for registration.” This is further confirmation that China’s NGOs cannot operate if their work brings them into direct confrontation with the State.
Herein lies the hypocrisy of the international donor community that provides funds for developmental aid to China. International NGOs will impose restrictions or conditions to recipient NGOs and even State organs, but when it comes to China, these conditions are not set out, nor are they applied. The Vice-President of The Asian Foundation, Nancy YuanVice, goes to great lengths to explain the importance of international developmental NGOs. She admits to the complexities of setting up NGOs in China because of the government’s lack of a formulated policy, and says: “Progress in legal regulation of NGOs in China has been uneven and the application and enforcement are often guided by political imperatives.” She steers well away from any mention of the need for civil society to attempt to challenge or scrutinise the State in this regard.
This brief synopsis of the ambivalence of civil society and State relations in China clearly indicates that any growth in the civil society sector within the PRC would constitute a venture into uncharted territory, and that the old concept of “one-size-fits-all” would not be viable.
The PRC government’s paranoia of any opposition forming due to the growth of the NGO sector or of any one NGO in China, combined with the recognition by government authorities of the need for NGOs, places NGO development in China in a precarious position. Developmental NGOs that may lobby for democratic processes in recipient countries cannot advocate for such policies in China. The Chinese State exerts total control over the future development of NGOs in the PRC, and does not tolerate action by civil society, as individuals or groups, which directly confronts the State - as was evidence in 1989 in Tiananmen Square.
Case Study
Tibet: NGOs and the PRC State
Since 1949, Tibet has been colonised by the PRC government. During this period, the ethnic Tibetans have suffered gross human rights violations, to such a degree that the International Commission of Jurists determined:
“… that acts of genocide had been committed in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans…” (The Case Concerning Tibet: 60).
The past decade has seen an extensive growth in “development” inside Tibet, which unfortunately is not benefiting the local inhabitants. Most development (or “progress” as it is named in PRC information packages) inside Tibet is aimed at accommodating the growing of Chinese migrant population and at augmenting the infrastructure and communication links between China and colonised Tibet. The conditions for NGOs to work in China apply to those seeking to operate in Tibet, and because of the political oppression in Tibet, these NGOs are placed under even stricter surveillance than are their peers in China.
Enrico dell’Angelo, of the New York-based Trace Foundation as quoted by Agents France-Presse (2002) stated: “NGOs working in Tibet must always try to follow the policies of the Central and Regional Government.” According to Wangyal of the Tibet Foundation UK, one of the reasons why much work done by NGOs inside Tibet does not directly benefit Tibetans is because “Governmental and large multinational agencies generally prefer to deal directly with central or provincial governments in China. At this level, ethnic Tibetans are unlikely to be decision makers” (Wangyal, 2004).
Wangyal confirms that the Chinese government still views foreign NGOs with suspicion: “The authorities still see them [international NGOs] as foreign agencies trying to import ‘Western values’ – generally believed to be anti-Communist and thus anti-Chinese.”
This suspicion permeates beyond the borders of China and Tibet and has even filtered into the corridors of the United Nations. The Chinese government managed to convince the UN to deny three Tibetan NGOs access to attend the World Summit on Sustainability and Development held in South Africa in 2002. According to Carnie, the Chinese government even managed to convince the South African Police Services to take action against Tibetans protesting at the WSSD. He reported: “A group of Tibetans and an Australian senator who staged a peaceful protest vigil were sent packing by police yesterday, apparently at the behest of Chinese government-sponsored NGOs (GONGOS)” (Carnie, 2002).
Tibet is an unusual case-study in the relationship between NGOs and the State. Being colonised, the ethnic Tibetans have a very limited say in any developmental projects in their own country. Because of the regulations devised and enforced by the occupying Chinese, NGOs, especially foreign organisations, are required to comply with and accept restrictions laid down by the central government. China’s imperialist approach in dictating to international democratic bodies such as the United Nations, and even to foreign, democratically elected governments in Africa and elsewhere, to prevent or limit NGO activity, stands as testimony of China’s thinly veiled fear of the potential power of civil society activity, both locally and globally. The restrictions placed on NGOs inside Tibet further exemplify that international aid organisations and NGOs do adapt the conditions governing their services and donations if it is beneficial to them - and even more so if the recipient State is as economically powerful as China.
It is imperative that international aid organisations working in Tibet critically evaluate their work to ensure that it does not facilitate any further marginalisation of the Tibetans. The important question is whether foreign aid and NGO activity inside Tibet assists the Chinese to consolidate their occupation of this country and whether or not the Tibetans derive direct benefits from the work of these NGOs.
Conclusion
The many NGOs that make up civil society will always need to engage in some interaction with the State and vice versa. Due to globalisation and the inability of governments to oversee all development activities, there is a need for NGOs to intervene or have such responsibilities relegated to them. Clark explains: “NGOs often work in remoter areas where perhaps no government official is seen from one year to the next” (Clark, 1991: 54). Even though most governments rely on NGOs, many still have some doubt as to their authenticity or alternative motives.
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that the relationship between NGOs and the State is inconsistent and that there are many factors that shape this relationship which have a direct bearing on the manner in which funds and projects are approved and implemented.
In examining NGOs, there must be some attempt to differentiate between the various kinds of NGOs. For example, there are those that work only within the environmental arena, while others work for poverty alleviation or other forms of social upliftment and empowerment. There are many other NGOs focusing on civil rights, while yet others committed to lobbying to the State regarding policy formulation on behalf of various constituencies. Over the years, this multitude of NGOs has grown to form the broad civil society movement (which also encompasses faith-based organisations or FBOs and self-sponsoring CBOs or community-based organisations).
Due to pressure from donor agencies on recipient countries, many NGOs have had to form political alliances and platforms in order to obtain funds. Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 39) state:
In order to achieve their aid objectives, donors have had to develop strategies that have two main aims … to make governments in developing countries act in ways to promote development and/or to replace these governments.
NGOs have come to play an increasingly prominent role in international development co-operation … The reason for this is the growing scepticism … towards States in the Third World.
(op cit.: 157)
Yet, even this explanation does not make the complex relationship between the State and Civil Society any clearer. Many developmental aid agencies continue to funnel funds to foreign governments, who in turn allocate the funds to specific NGOs within the country to assist with development projects. In order for NGOs to be receive monies to support their development projects, they are forced to comply with government regulations, thus calling their independence into question.
Grafted upon, and further complicating, this dynamic is the reliance by the State on NGOs to assist with their policies. Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 166) elaborate:
Because the State has narrowed its functions due to economic decline or pressure from developmental banks and other donor organisations … more pressure is placed on NGOs to fill the gap in relation to public authorities. Increasing numbers of NGOs have arrived at the conclusion that gap-filling, as an independent strategy, is unfortunate. It frees States from responsibilities that rightly should be theirs.
It can be concluded that the dynamics in the relationship between NGOs and the State are controlled by which party holds and leverages the greater power and influence. In most Third World countries, it is the Northern NGOs and donor agencies that currently wield this power and so dictate certain terms to recipients.
Whereas, in China, even though its human rights record is superficially condemned by the international community, many governments, donor agencies, NGOs and global bodies are prepared to ignore this in order to be active inside China and Tibet, whether for beneficial or maleficent purposes. Donor agencies do not hold the PRC government to account by, say, threatening to withhold or delay the provision of much-needed funds, as they do in the case of some developing countries if their governments do not comply with the donor’s stipulations.
Until the two sectoral entities bridge this divide by finding common ground as to the primary objective of their work and collaboration (i.e. the betterment of living conditions for all), the relationship between the two will always be fraught with contentious issues and complex debate, which creates an obstacle to further and effective co-operation and development. Sadly, the very “reason-for-being” of NGOs, and the moral and political obligations entrusted to the State by its electorate, tend to be forgotten or blurred in the often adversarial relationship between NGOs and the State.
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“Civil Society is the creation of the modern world”
Hegel: The Philosophy of Right
Schecter (2000: 176)
Introduction
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have always played an important role in development. The relationship between key stakeholders, i.e. donor agencies, international development agencies, the State and communities targeted for development aid, is critical for analysis in determining the role NGOs have played in the development. Today NGOs are considered part of and a primary constituent in the body of civil society, even though many of them focus on different roles and goals, as will be exemplified in this paper.
There are many ways to define an NGO. According to Ye, foreign donors and scholars identify NGOs by “looking at the organisation’s relationship with the government.” He says that some observers “… believe the closer the organisation is to the government, the less likely it is to be a real NGO.” (Ye, 2003: 2). However, herein lies a paradox. Due to the intrinsic relationship between donor organisations and/or international NGOs, when it comes to funding and implementation of projects, the State and localised NGOs often form partnerships to operationalise the approved programme.
What is civil society? White (2001: 379) as cited by Sabatini (2002: 8) offers the following definition, from the perspective of international donor agencies, of the concept of civil society:
Generally speaking, donors … define civil society as: an associational realm between State and family, populated by organisations which are separate from the State, enjoying autonomy in relation to the State and … formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values.
The juncture at which civil society comes into conflict with the State is when civil society begins to advocate for either changes in State policies, or with enough vigour to threaten the overthrow of the State. Political confrontations and mistrust between the State and civil society does impede positive developmental projects, and also jeopardises the successful roll-out of developmental aid through civil society, working in partnership with the State.
This paper will reflect on the various factors that contribute either positively or negatively to the complex relationship between civil society and the State. Many governments in the Southern hemisphere adopt the approach that Northern nations are pushing their particular political agendas in veiled ways through the provision of development aid, and that many localised NGOs have unwittingly become pawns for these foreign States in .
The primary tensions that arise between State and civil society when it comes to development are space and power; Roberts (1974: 14) as quoted by Kaplan (1996: 53) explains:
Development is the more equal distribution of power. Thus development in the independent phase demands the more equal distribution of power. The struggle for independence may lead to empowerment Рthe ultimate clich̩ of the development fraternity - but leaves the one thus empowered with the same kind of power as those who have been fought against, precisely because they have this power.
The fundamental argument is: can the State be removed from the equation of development? Due to the complexities and varied definitions of what development is, and what role civil society plays in developmental progress, the importance of the State in such progress (or lack thereof) cannot be denied or diminished. The State’s role is vital to development. The role becomes complicated by governmental attitudes that view the politicisation of civil society as a threat, but at the same time consider developmental NGOs as desired contributors in that NGOs can relieve some of the State’s responsibilities in terms of delivery of public services.
Where governments are ineffective in such delivery, and in need of development funds, it is far easier for donor organisations to dictate the terms of envisaged outcomes. An example of this kind of manipulation is given by Martinussen and Pedersen: “More and more donors wanted to increase foreign aid only to those countries that could document that they had formulated and implemented ‘correct’ policies” (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003: 50). Within these same countries civil society can often operate with relative strength, with the understanding that they will be supported by international donor agencies because civil society groups “help to broaden political participation” (Sabatini, 2002: 8).
The conditions under which most NGOs operate in the People’s Republic of China contradict this thinking. As a global economic power, the PRC’s one-party Communist State dictates the terms and conditions that NGOs (in this case, not “civil society”, because there is no such entity in its true form permitted in China) operate within the country’s borders, including the territories that it illegally occupies.
It is interesting to note that the United Nations articulates NGOs as being organisations that:
Steinberg (2001)
… generally function to service under-served or neglected populations, to expand the freedom of or to empower people to engage in advocacy for social change … to democratise unequal power relations aimed at influencing policy or reality itself.
This definition does not apply when it comes to NGOs operating inside China, as no NGO is permitted to work towards “democratis(ing) unequal power relations” in China.
The History of NGOs and Civil Society
Many commentators argue, as does Schechter, that it was the rise in Poland of the Solidarity movement in 1981 that: “…constituted civil society as an autonomous socio-political space against the State” (Schecter, 2000: 1). The rise of the civil society movement in Europe contributed towards the fall of the Berlin War in 1989, which led to the collapse of Communism and the ending of the Cold War. These changes in global politics in turn paved the way for transformation within the development sector worldwide.
During the course of the past few decades, NGOs have evolved in accordance with the demands set by funding agencies as well as changes that have taken place in the global political landscape. Four categories of NGOs have been discerned during this period: according to Martinussen and Pedersen, first-generation NGOs focus on “emergency relief efforts” while second-generation NGOs “enter into co-operation with target groups.” Third-generation NGOs not only work with local communities but also aim “to change the structures and institutions in society”, leading to the fourth-generation NGOs that directly confront the State on social issues (2003: 145 –146).
Globalisation has played a pivotal role in the development of the broader civil society movement and its relationship with the State; Schechter (2000: 14 – 17) argues thus:
The rise of civil society to theoretical prominence in recent years has been accompanied by a parallel surge in interest in globalisation. This interest has been accompanied by the increasing awareness that the territorially located nation-state will not play a pre-eminent role in political life … The innumerable conflicts in the post-Cold War world indicate that the problems of world peace and environmental safety simply go beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. It is in this context that much hope has been aroused by global civil society, represented at least in outline by the growing number of Non– and Quasi-Governmental Organisations.
Donor Agencies, Civil Society and the State
NGOs are invariably linked to aid agencies due to their dependency on funding from such development aid agencies. During the Cold War, developmental aid was linked to foreign policy by donor countries, but the end of the Cold War altered both the concept of such aid and the contexts within which it has since been approved and secured.
The original goals of providing development funds may have changed, but as Martinussen and Pedersen conclude: “Donors set most of the agenda and the conditions of co-operation” (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003: 1). These authors claim that foreign aid, even since the end of the Cold War, has expanded to: “… from changing … economic and social conditions to including institutional development and political reforms” (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003: 4).
The role of the State in recipient countries is vital. Many donor countries and agencies still regard these countries’ governments as restrictive entities but are compelled to defer to statutory bodies as conduits for their funding. It is here that the paradox of the relationship between development agencies and the State comes into play. It is not uncommon for NGOs to receive funding distributed by government ministries that have received the monies from development aid agencies that are often in conflict with the State over social issues.
Globalisation
In the modern, globalised world, NGOs play a pivotal role in ensuring that governments comply with and carry out their elected roles to uplift their citizens economically and socially. It is in this context that NGOs can both assist and hinder the State. Many governments view the surge in NGO growth as an opportunity to transfer or “delegate” State responsibilities to NGOs, and are not above using NGOs for political mobilisation. Maslyukivska (1999: 2) gives such an example of governments using NGOs for their own benefit:
The conservative governments of Reagan and Thatcher made support for the voluntary sector a central part of their strategies to reduce government social spending.
Conversely, it is argued that the growth of NGOs serves to counter the strength of the State and the financial market when it comes to development. In an assessment of the role NGOs play in development, Sha says: “ … the complex group termed ‘NGOs’ are seen as the weaker part of the triumvirate, or “third sector” to counter the other two actors, the State and the market” Sha, 2003: 3). The State, Sha argues, may welcome the intervention of NGOs when it comes to assisting with social issues such as: “ … providing for the homeless, elderly and sick, not least because this reduces State expenditure, it may take less kindly to advocacy groups that promote causes contrary to government policy or organisations that challenge the legitimacy of the State”. (Sha, 2003: 4).
A further challenge facing NGOs and development work in general are the continually evolving local and international political platforms. Some NGOs that have worked towards development goals in specific communities find themselves having to contest social and political issues with officials of the very government they fought for, in order to bring about critical change in countries. A prime example is South Africa.
NGO Relationship with States
Many of the large NGOs in the Northern hemisphere are reliant on funding from their own governments. This dependency calls into question the veracity of the term “non-governmental” and the organisations’ impartiality. This follows the thinking of Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 162) who say:
Have they [Northern NGOs] lost some of their political independence and special character and instead come to resemble official aid organisations with respect to objectives and strategies?
According to Martinussen and Pedersen, due to the negative connotations inherent in this particular position, many international developmental NGOs - such as Oxfam’s branch in the USA - made policy changes restricting the amount of State-derived funding, or formulated firm policy guidelines for accepting such funds (2003: 164). In so doing, these NGOs have attempted to deflect groundless allegations from recipient States that the NGOs are mere “front companies” for foreign governments.
Many NGOs in the Southern hemisphere have taken the form of “gap-fillers”, Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 166), by helping their governments with roll-out of projects and specifically with ensuring that donor funds reach the targeted beneficiaries. These authors argue that NGOs, particularly in the South, are forced into this role because: “The State has narrowed its functions, due to economic decline or pressure from development banks and other donor organisations” (2003: 166).
The fundamental dilemma posed by this paradoxical relationship between NGOs and the State rests on difficult choices such as: if the State allows NGOs to take on its role of service provider for certain developmental projects, should the State then relinquish its authority in this sector, or could it reserve the right to dictate the terms and conditions of how the NGO operates?
The People’s Republic of China is an example of NGOs being allowed to operate only under the specified conditions directed by the State. In viewing the relationship between local NGOs and the State in sub-Saharan Africa, Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 167 and 168) observe:
Central authorities rarely interfere in the work of private organisations at the micro-level in remote regions … because they do not have the capacity to do so. However, local politicians often do interfere in NGOs’ work. In weak States, where authorities already have problems legitimising their exercise of power, difficulties can arise when NGOs assume the role of communicating and supporting the demands of the poor, marginalised and oppressed groups in society.
Even developmental NGOs that are not politically orientated have an obligation to inform the communities they are assisting on their social rights, which in turn can bring NGOs into conflict with the State.
The extent to which NGOs serve to relieve the State from its elected obligations is another cause for concern, that being the question of transparency and accountability. Edwards and Hulme (1996: 968) as quoted by Cross (1997) argue:
… there is a deeper concern about the possible rewriting of the ‘social contract’ between government and its citizens as a result of NGO substitution for the State in key aspects of the development process … The accountability of a non-elected NGO when providing services to ‘clients’ is very different to the formal relationships established between governments and citizens.
This highlights the issue that States can renege on their obligations to society because the NGO sector is, in effect, doing the work that the electorate, and particularly taxpayers, rightfully expect their government to undertake. This can apply if the State has truly relinquished total control of any development projects undertaken by the NGO. Conditions like this have spotlighted the importance of open and negotiated participation between the State and NGOs.
Civil society and the State - Competitors or Partners?
An essential question regarding the functioning of NGOs is, according to Cross: “ … whether NGOs should be competitors or partners with the State – that is, whether NGOs should maintain their distance from the State so as to retain their autonomy, or whether they should work hand-in-hand with State projects” (Cross, 1997: 2). This argument is dependent on the stance of the donor country or aid agency funding the NGOs.
Due to the agenda or policies of specific aid agencies, NGOs may have to rely either on the State for funds, or on monies channelled through governments by donor agencies. Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 12) point out that:
Large industrial countries in particular have administrated and distributed a large part of their development assistance in accordance with political and national security priorities. The same applied earlier to the development assistance provided by the Soviet Union, and it still applies to aid from India and China.
The role of donor agencies and their usage of NGOs for developmental projects is taken further in the comments of Howell and Pearce, as cited by Sha, who argue that often donors think of themselves as being: “ … neutral actors, brokering relations between the State, business, and civil society” (Sha, 2003: 5). They also contend that development aid directed from the North to the South may well be another form of neo-colonialism, “… in the post-Cold War era, aimed at controlling the nature of political regimes and extending global markets.”
The approach by Northern countries and donor agencies focusing on development in the Southern regions is that the recipient governments cannot, on their own, make positive contributions to development. Berthoud (1992: 73) argues that the State is an extension of development, and observes:
Through the State, as the theory goes, one creates, maintains and regulates markets for economic growth, the results of which should be distributed [by NGOs] as fairly as possible throughout society. Growth with redistribution is clearly the model’s ideal of social justice.
Therefore, development agencies contend that their assistance through funding development NGOs within Civil Society results in positive benefits for the recipient countries and communities. This point cannot be denied, but what has been shown is that these agencies can operate with a hidden agenda, and the total dependency by NGOs on State funding nullifies, or at least diminishes, the impartiality of such organisations. In this context, it is difficult to accept the stance taken by many development donor agencies that NGOs can extract themselves from dependency on the State. Where governments provide the channels for disbursement of donor funding, the NGOs themselves become reliant on the State’s co-operation, and the danger exists that procedures and policies could warp the motivation and methods originally intended by the NGOs and their funders.
Participation between NGOs and the State
Some observers claim that there cannot be much collaboration or participation between NGOs and the State until after, “a process of retraining and re-orientation” has taken place, as stated by (Graaff and Louw, 1992 by Roodt, 2001: 489). These authors report on findings that State departments and government leadership become wary of or hostile towards NGOs that attempt to intrude on their space.
However, in times of developmental or national crises, NGOs and governments do come together for the betterment of the citizens of the particular country. A case in point is the collaboration of NGOs and the South African government in the roll-out of the national anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment programme, province by province.
Case Study:
IRIN PlusNews (2004) published the following example of NGO and State collaboration:
About 90 NGOs in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province has teamed up to work with the government in rolling out ARV drugs, in the first structured civil society response of its kind in South Africa. Cati Vawda, Director of the Durban based Children’s Rights Centre stated: “Long-term co-ordination of services between civil society and government, and good monitoring of the process, has very high organisational demands.” Vawda claims that official recognition of the collaboration is still outstanding and the one prohibiting factor is that the Health Department “has not developed an ethos of sharing specific information with civil society as yet.”
The complexities of NGO and State relationship is exemplified in the report by Vawda claiming that the NGOs wish to remain independent and therefore will seek their own funding from foreign non-governmental and international donors. The State, in response to this, may object to particular donors’ involvement or be in conflict with the specific conditions donors might formulate on the NGOs.
In the development environment, the intentions of both the State and civil society might be pure, but such intentions have not manifested into effective delivery to those trying to operationalise policy; this arises either because of lack of capacity or because methodology devised and decisions made remotely, and without due consideration of local contexts, are not workable on the ground.
The above case study is a prime example of this scenario. Another example of sincere beginnings is evident in President Mbeki’s statement that: “The government is also paying the closest attention to … create the possibility for an ongoing dialogue between government and representatives of civil society formations, NGOs” (New Agenda, 2004: 31).
Neither group can dictate models of participation in projects. Instead, a mutual understanding needs to be reached for all the actors to understand their individual and collaborative roles in fulfilling shared goals, which in the final analysis, should remain as the driving motivation and reason for the existence of project. The approach of focusing on common goals and forsaking individual or organisational biases to ensure the success of developmental programmes is give substance by Maslyukivska when he argues: “A healthy relationship is only conceivable when both parties share common objectives” (1999: 21).
The potential for such understanding and effective partnership is often confused and hindered by the tendency for parties to compete against one other for power in their constituencies, particularly in the form of “gate-keeping”. White (1999: 309) puts this forward thus:
Both State and civil society are essentially political and contested domains, in both conceptual and practical terms. NGOs working with the State offer an opportunity to expand the scope of their operations, broaden their influence and participate in the formulation of the national development agenda. The State, on the other hand, may see collaborating with the NGOs as a chance to gain some reflected moral glory, retrieve a hold on donor funds, and neutralise potential opposition, and achieve more efficient and cost-0effective implementation of policy. What is open to question, however, is whether these mutual interests necessarily coincide with the interests of those whose name they all invoke.
The failure of NGOs in Development
While the aims of many developmental NGOs may be legitimate and commendable, some fail in their purpose due to a number of typical shortcomings. The most common is a lack of understanding of the local society and the contexts of its culture, religion, as well as community strengths, needs and priorities. Another factor which creates setbacks is a lack of accountability and transparency. Clark claims: “There is surprisingly little objective reporting of NGO projects … Until recently there has been little [and still is] pressure on donor NGOs for more disciplined evaluations” (Clark, 1991: 53).
These deficiencies are often used by the State to legitimise its negative response to NGO inclusion in formulating development polices. Understanding cultural needs is fundamental to the success of any development project undertaken by NGOs. According to Eade: “[Developmental] strategies must be sensitive to cultural roots” (Eade, 2002: 35). Brunnstrom comments: “Respect for local history and culture, knowledge and practices are acknowledged as basic preconditions for the provision of adequate assistance. The international community frequently disregards them” (Brunnstrom, 2003: 310).
A further limitation impeding the work and tainting perceptions of NGOs in development is an inability to set clearly defined goals; as Brunnstrom describes: “Clear goals and strategies are key to both indigenous and international NGOs in their development work" (Brunnstrom, 2003: 314). Another notable failure derives from the distance between donor NGOs and localised NGOs that implement activities on behalf of their overseas funders. Martinussen and Pedersen explain that: “The distance between … donors and recipients has become greater during the 1980s and 1990s. This greater distance to the final target group of poor people is a problem for most donors (bilateral, multilateral and NGOs)” (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003: 176).
Technological advances such as the Internet and e-mail have, to a certain extent, assisted in narrowing this gap, but only in areas where the required infrastructure to support the use of this technology is available.
China
Civil society faces a great challenge in the People’s Republic of China. Not only does it have to navigate the often confusing bureaucratic procedures set up by the Chinese State authorities to receive accreditation, but NGOs also face the continual scrutiny of the Chinese government, which is intensely alert to any actions that might be deemed as threatening to the stability of China.
Yet, even with the restrictions imposed on NGOs in China, there are success stories, and one has to recognise that through specific targeted projects, China has managed to reduce its poverty levels. Watts reports: “According to the World Bank, the number of people subsisting on less than $1 a day has fallen from 490 million in 1981 to 88 million – or from 49% of the population to 6.9%.”
Chinese State’s use of NGOs
During the 1930s and 1940s, according to Ye, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the insistence of Mao Zedong, actually encouraged civil society organisations within China to join forces in order to fight the Japanese and Kuomintang. After the CCP came to power in 1949, Mao began to purge the very same civil society organisations that helped him come into power. Most NGOs were banned outright, and others such as the Youth League and independent trade unions were incorporated into the State’s apparatus, thereby losing their independence (2003: 6 – 7). Between the 1950s and 1980s, there was very little NGO activity in China due to the State’s stance that most NGOs were counter-revolutionary.
The Chinese State and Civil Society
The 1980s saw China on the road to economic reform and the government recognised that it was not in a position to oversee the many reforms that were needed in rural communities. According to Chen, the Deputy Director of China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs: “All levels of government are taking the nurturing and development of civil organisations as an important component of answering the call for a ‘small government and large society involvement” (Chen, 2001: 5). The Chinese State may encourage the growth of society involvement through social organisations, but their activities and policies are stringently monitored for possible dissension and where any opposition to the State is perceived, as in the case of the religious organisation Falun Gong, such organisations are immediately banned.
The Chinese government maintains that civil society must operate within the framework of the law, and would never allow organisations the visibility or public platform to challenge its authority, (as did South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign). The Chinese government claims that many NGOs are not in a position to act independently and are plagued by corruption and incompetence. Chen (2001: 3) comments:
NGOs are not yet ready to operate independently … Because the structures of some NGOs do not accord with the requirements of a market economy, they have a tendency to rely overly much on the government. Internal controls within China’s NGOs are imperfect as they lack a complete set of democratic management mechanisms, thereby greatly weakening their effectiveness.
However, the wording used by Chen is misleading. Since the Chinese State is far from being democratic, how can it be claimed that NGOs lack “democratic management mechanisms”, and were they to demonstrate any signs of democratic leanings or independence of mindset, they could be deemed as a threat to the State and closed down.
In fairness, Chen does claim that China does not (at the time of his writing) have any policies in place to properly regulate non-profit organisations. Ye backs Chen’s contention that there is corruption and a lack of accountability within China’s civil society sector (2003: 20). The question of accountability by China’s development stakeholders is no different to that faced by many other NGOs and States throughout the world.
A recent newspaper report published in the China Daily reiterated the need for NGOs in China to assist the government in providing social services. The report stated that at present, there are 134,000 registered NGOs in China (2004). The report also confirmed that in order for these organisations to work in China, they must have a link with the State in the form of “a governmental department or semi-official body as sponsor for registration.” This is further confirmation that China’s NGOs cannot operate if their work brings them into direct confrontation with the State.
Herein lies the hypocrisy of the international donor community that provides funds for developmental aid to China. International NGOs will impose restrictions or conditions to recipient NGOs and even State organs, but when it comes to China, these conditions are not set out, nor are they applied. The Vice-President of The Asian Foundation, Nancy YuanVice, goes to great lengths to explain the importance of international developmental NGOs. She admits to the complexities of setting up NGOs in China because of the government’s lack of a formulated policy, and says: “Progress in legal regulation of NGOs in China has been uneven and the application and enforcement are often guided by political imperatives.” She steers well away from any mention of the need for civil society to attempt to challenge or scrutinise the State in this regard.
This brief synopsis of the ambivalence of civil society and State relations in China clearly indicates that any growth in the civil society sector within the PRC would constitute a venture into uncharted territory, and that the old concept of “one-size-fits-all” would not be viable.
The PRC government’s paranoia of any opposition forming due to the growth of the NGO sector or of any one NGO in China, combined with the recognition by government authorities of the need for NGOs, places NGO development in China in a precarious position. Developmental NGOs that may lobby for democratic processes in recipient countries cannot advocate for such policies in China. The Chinese State exerts total control over the future development of NGOs in the PRC, and does not tolerate action by civil society, as individuals or groups, which directly confronts the State - as was evidence in 1989 in Tiananmen Square.
Case Study
Tibet: NGOs and the PRC State
Since 1949, Tibet has been colonised by the PRC government. During this period, the ethnic Tibetans have suffered gross human rights violations, to such a degree that the International Commission of Jurists determined:
“… that acts of genocide had been committed in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans…” (The Case Concerning Tibet: 60).
The past decade has seen an extensive growth in “development” inside Tibet, which unfortunately is not benefiting the local inhabitants. Most development (or “progress” as it is named in PRC information packages) inside Tibet is aimed at accommodating the growing of Chinese migrant population and at augmenting the infrastructure and communication links between China and colonised Tibet. The conditions for NGOs to work in China apply to those seeking to operate in Tibet, and because of the political oppression in Tibet, these NGOs are placed under even stricter surveillance than are their peers in China.
Enrico dell’Angelo, of the New York-based Trace Foundation as quoted by Agents France-Presse (2002) stated: “NGOs working in Tibet must always try to follow the policies of the Central and Regional Government.” According to Wangyal of the Tibet Foundation UK, one of the reasons why much work done by NGOs inside Tibet does not directly benefit Tibetans is because “Governmental and large multinational agencies generally prefer to deal directly with central or provincial governments in China. At this level, ethnic Tibetans are unlikely to be decision makers” (Wangyal, 2004).
Wangyal confirms that the Chinese government still views foreign NGOs with suspicion: “The authorities still see them [international NGOs] as foreign agencies trying to import ‘Western values’ – generally believed to be anti-Communist and thus anti-Chinese.”
This suspicion permeates beyond the borders of China and Tibet and has even filtered into the corridors of the United Nations. The Chinese government managed to convince the UN to deny three Tibetan NGOs access to attend the World Summit on Sustainability and Development held in South Africa in 2002. According to Carnie, the Chinese government even managed to convince the South African Police Services to take action against Tibetans protesting at the WSSD. He reported: “A group of Tibetans and an Australian senator who staged a peaceful protest vigil were sent packing by police yesterday, apparently at the behest of Chinese government-sponsored NGOs (GONGOS)” (Carnie, 2002).
Tibet is an unusual case-study in the relationship between NGOs and the State. Being colonised, the ethnic Tibetans have a very limited say in any developmental projects in their own country. Because of the regulations devised and enforced by the occupying Chinese, NGOs, especially foreign organisations, are required to comply with and accept restrictions laid down by the central government. China’s imperialist approach in dictating to international democratic bodies such as the United Nations, and even to foreign, democratically elected governments in Africa and elsewhere, to prevent or limit NGO activity, stands as testimony of China’s thinly veiled fear of the potential power of civil society activity, both locally and globally. The restrictions placed on NGOs inside Tibet further exemplify that international aid organisations and NGOs do adapt the conditions governing their services and donations if it is beneficial to them - and even more so if the recipient State is as economically powerful as China.
It is imperative that international aid organisations working in Tibet critically evaluate their work to ensure that it does not facilitate any further marginalisation of the Tibetans. The important question is whether foreign aid and NGO activity inside Tibet assists the Chinese to consolidate their occupation of this country and whether or not the Tibetans derive direct benefits from the work of these NGOs.
Conclusion
The many NGOs that make up civil society will always need to engage in some interaction with the State and vice versa. Due to globalisation and the inability of governments to oversee all development activities, there is a need for NGOs to intervene or have such responsibilities relegated to them. Clark explains: “NGOs often work in remoter areas where perhaps no government official is seen from one year to the next” (Clark, 1991: 54). Even though most governments rely on NGOs, many still have some doubt as to their authenticity or alternative motives.
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that the relationship between NGOs and the State is inconsistent and that there are many factors that shape this relationship which have a direct bearing on the manner in which funds and projects are approved and implemented.
In examining NGOs, there must be some attempt to differentiate between the various kinds of NGOs. For example, there are those that work only within the environmental arena, while others work for poverty alleviation or other forms of social upliftment and empowerment. There are many other NGOs focusing on civil rights, while yet others committed to lobbying to the State regarding policy formulation on behalf of various constituencies. Over the years, this multitude of NGOs has grown to form the broad civil society movement (which also encompasses faith-based organisations or FBOs and self-sponsoring CBOs or community-based organisations).
Due to pressure from donor agencies on recipient countries, many NGOs have had to form political alliances and platforms in order to obtain funds. Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 39) state:
In order to achieve their aid objectives, donors have had to develop strategies that have two main aims … to make governments in developing countries act in ways to promote development and/or to replace these governments.
NGOs have come to play an increasingly prominent role in international development co-operation … The reason for this is the growing scepticism … towards States in the Third World.
(op cit.: 157)
Yet, even this explanation does not make the complex relationship between the State and Civil Society any clearer. Many developmental aid agencies continue to funnel funds to foreign governments, who in turn allocate the funds to specific NGOs within the country to assist with development projects. In order for NGOs to be receive monies to support their development projects, they are forced to comply with government regulations, thus calling their independence into question.
Grafted upon, and further complicating, this dynamic is the reliance by the State on NGOs to assist with their policies. Martinussen and Pedersen (2003: 166) elaborate:
Because the State has narrowed its functions due to economic decline or pressure from developmental banks and other donor organisations … more pressure is placed on NGOs to fill the gap in relation to public authorities. Increasing numbers of NGOs have arrived at the conclusion that gap-filling, as an independent strategy, is unfortunate. It frees States from responsibilities that rightly should be theirs.
It can be concluded that the dynamics in the relationship between NGOs and the State are controlled by which party holds and leverages the greater power and influence. In most Third World countries, it is the Northern NGOs and donor agencies that currently wield this power and so dictate certain terms to recipients.
Whereas, in China, even though its human rights record is superficially condemned by the international community, many governments, donor agencies, NGOs and global bodies are prepared to ignore this in order to be active inside China and Tibet, whether for beneficial or maleficent purposes. Donor agencies do not hold the PRC government to account by, say, threatening to withhold or delay the provision of much-needed funds, as they do in the case of some developing countries if their governments do not comply with the donor’s stipulations.
Until the two sectoral entities bridge this divide by finding common ground as to the primary objective of their work and collaboration (i.e. the betterment of living conditions for all), the relationship between the two will always be fraught with contentious issues and complex debate, which creates an obstacle to further and effective co-operation and development. Sadly, the very “reason-for-being” of NGOs, and the moral and political obligations entrusted to the State by its electorate, tend to be forgotten or blurred in the often adversarial relationship between NGOs and the State.
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